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Summary findings
Dethier, Ghanem, and Zoli analyze whether  political  Their empirical findings clearly reveal that democracy
freedom and civil liberties help or hinder economic  has facilitated economic liberalization in countries of
liberalization, using panel data from 25 postcommunist  Central and Eastern Europe and the former Soviet
countries of Central and Eastern Europe and the former  Union.
Soviet Union between 1992 and 1997.  This conclusion is confirmed under various model
Building on arguments and counterarguments put  specifications, for both ordinary and two-stage least
forth  in recent literature, they identify the channels  squares procedures and using two different measures of
through  which political freedom affects economic  liberalization.
liberalization during the transition. Then they test the  The econometric results reveal that the existence of a
arguments empirically with an econometric framework  vibrant civil society at the start of the transition has the
that takes into account possible problems with  most explanatory power in the authors'  regressions.
simultaneity between the economic and political
transitions.
This paper  -a  product of the Poverty Reduction and Economic Management Sector Unit, Europe and Central Asia Region
- was presented at a seminar at the World Bank in April 1999. Copies of the paper are available free from the World Bank,
1818 H  Street NW, Washington, DC 20433.  Please contact Hafez Ghanem, room H4-201,  telephone  202-458-5557,
Internet  address hghanem@worldbank.org.  Policy Research Working Papers are  also posted  on  the  Web at  http://
www.worldbank.org/html/dec/Publications/Workpapers/home.html.  The  other  authors  may  be  contacted  at  jdethier
@worldbank.org or ezoli@worldbank.org. October 1999.  (30 pages)
The Policy Research Working Paper Series disseminates the findings of work in  progress  to  encourage the exchange of ideas about
development issues.  An objective of the series  is to get the findings out quickly, even if the presentations are less than fully polished. The
papers  carry  the names  of the authors  and should  be cited  accordingly.  The  findings,  interpretations,  and conclusions  expressed  in this
paper  are entirely  those  of the authors.  They do not necessarily  represent  the view of the World  Bank,  its Executive  Directors,  or the
countries  they  represent.
Produced by the Policy Research Dissemination CenterDoes Democracy Faicilitate  the Economic Transition?
An Empirical Study  of Central and Eastern  Europe
and the Former Soviet  Union
Jean-Jacques Dethier, Hafez Ghanem,  Edda Zoli*
The World Bank
Keywords: Transition, Democracy, Political Economy.
JEL Classification: E6, P3
* This  paper  was presented  at  a  serninar at  the  World  Bank  in  June  1999.  We  thank  you  all  the
participants for their useful cormments  and suggestions.Il.  Introduction
The  countries  of  Eastern  Europe  and the  Fonner  Soviet  Union  embarked  on  two
transitions: from a command to a market economy (economic transition), and from an
authoritarian political regime to a democratic one (political transition).  They have had
varying degrees of success on both fronts.  Some countries, e.g. Hungary and Poland,
have had remarkable success liberalizing their economies and their political  systems.
Others, e.g. Belarus and Uzbekistan, continue to have economic and political systems
reminiscent of the Soviet era.  This paper tries to explore the links between economic
and political transitions using panel data from 25 post-communist  countries in Europe
and Central Asia.'
Economic theory does not  give a clear answer on whether political  freedoms
help  or  hinder  economic  transiltion.  Surveys  presented  in  Rodrik  (1996)  and  in
Williamson (1994) present arguments for both sides of the debate. Balcerowicz (1997),
and Balcerowicz and Gelb (1994), discussing the interplay between  economic policy
and democratization, argue for a "'big bang" approach to economic transition, but leave
open the question of whether democratic governments are better able to implement the
"big bang" than authoritarian ones.  The analysis in Roland (1992, 1994 and 1997) and
in Dewatripont and Roland (1992) indicates that, under majority rule, time consistency
and adverse selection problems generate a slow and gradualist economic transition.  On
the other hand, Aslund et al. (1996) argue that rent-seeking  authoritarian governments
slow-down stabilization policies needed in the first stage of transition.
The empirical literature presents a different picture: it indicates a strong positive
correlation between political  and economic reforms in the post-communist  countries.
Using data for 26 transition countries de Melo et al. (1996) found a correlation of 0.8
between  their  index  of  economic  liberalization  and  the  Freedom  House  index  of
political freedom.  De Melo et al. (1997) use panel data to estimate the determinants of
economic  liberalization  in  transition  countries.  Political  freedom  appears  with  a
1 This includes all of the countries of  Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) and the Former  Soviet Union
(FSU), except for Bosnia and  Yugoslavia (Serbia and  Montenegro) for which  necessary  data are not
available.
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positive  and  highly  significant  coefficient  in  their  equation.  The  Freedom  House
Nations  in  Transit report  (1999)  divides the transition  countries  into three  groups:
consolidated  democracies,  transitional  societies,  and  consolidated  autocracies 3. It
argues that political and economic freedoms are correlated with faster growth, because
growth  in  the  consolidated  democracies  averaged 4.7%  in  1997, while  transitional
societies had  an average growth of  1.4%, and consolidated autocracies witnessed  an
average economic decline of 2.8%. Clearly, an explanation for many of those empirical
findings  could  simply be  that  faster  growing  economies  are  able to  afford  greater
political freedoms, which  would be consistent with the conclusion of Barro (1997) that
improvements in standards of living predict increases in democracy.
Do greater political and civil freedoms help or hinder economic liberalization?
Here we attempt to  shed additional light on this  question on the basis  of the recent
historical experience of 25 transition countries.  We do this in two ways: we identify
the channels through which political freedom could affect economic liberalization, and
we then carry out empirical tests, while trying to deal with problems of simultaneity.
The paper is divided into six sections.  After this introduction, section II summarizes
the  analytical  arguments-and  counter-arguments-of  why  more  political  freedom
could endanger the economic transition.  Section III presents  the estimated equation,
section IV shows our empirical findings,  section V provides tests  of robustness and
section VI summarizes the main conclusions and areas for future work.
II.  Are Democracy and Economic Transition Incompatible?
Arguments For and Against
There  are  compelling  arguments  for  why  authoritarian  leadership  may  be
needed to push through reforms in the early stages of economic transition.  But, there
2 This  result may be simply  a reflection  of simultaneity  bias, since  political freedom  is probably  not pre-
determined  with  respect  to economic  liberalization.
3 According  to Freedom House consolidated  democracies  are: the Czech Republic,  Estonia,  Hungary,
Latvia,  Lithuania,  Poland  and Slovenia. They define  transitional  societies  to include:  Albania,  Armenia,
Azerbaijan, Bosnia and  Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyz Republic,
Macedonia,  Moldova,  Mongolia,  Romania,  Russia, Slovakia,  Ukraine and Yugoslavia. Freedom  House
identifies  four consolidated  autocracies:  Belarus,  Tajikistan,  Turkmenistan,  and  Uzbekistan.
3are equally compelling argumenls as to why democratic reforms  must  come first to
provide political space for economic liberalization.
We start by reviewing arguments put forward to explain why greater political
freedom may slow down the economic transition.  Proponents of this view  feel that
although  economic  reforms  and  political  freedom  are  both  "good",  they  can
unfortunately  rarely  be  achieved  at  the  same  time.  In  this  view,  authoritarian
governments may be  needed to  implement difficult economic reformns,  that  are then
consolidated by successor democratic governments.  Economists appear to be facing a
dilemma: "on the one hand, good economic policy should produce favorable economic
outcomes and therefore should prove also to be good politics; on the other hand, the
implementation  of  good  economic policy  is  often  viewed  as  requiring  strong  and
autonomous (not  to  say authoritarian)  leadership" 4. Chile  is  a  good example  of  a
country  where  economic  refonns  implemented  by  an  authoritarian  regime  were
subsequently embraced by more (lemocratic successor governments.
The  need  for  authoritarian  leadership  would  be  particularly  true  in  post-
communist countries, where econaomic  reforms often involve mass layoffs and cuts in
entitlements.  Applying the Chilean experience to these countries, one would argue that
a  strong  "autonomous"  leadership  is  needed  in  the  early  stages  of  transition  to
implement  economic reforms.  Once the  difficult part of the economic  transition  is
implemented, the process of democratization can start.  Autonomous governments may
have an easier time liberalizing their economies.  For instance, China was able to carry
out  a great  deal of economic  liberalization while maintaining  the Communist  Party
firmly in power and limiting political and civil liberties.  On the contrary, in Russia
early political liberalization has resulted in institutional chaos and an inability to carry
out economic reforms.  This type of argument can be heard in many parts of the Former
Soviet Union. 5
Another  way  of  presenting  the  preceding  argument,  is  that  autonomous
leadership is needed at the beginning of transition, because electorates often turn  down
economic reforms even when it is known ex ante that they would benefit a majority of
voters.  Fernandez  and  Rodrik  (1991)  show  that  uncertainty  about  the  impact  of
4 Rodrilk  (1996) p.10.
4economic reforms  at the level of individuals could lead a rational  electorate to vote
against reforms that are known to benefit a majority of them.  Thus, policies that would
be popular ex-post are often not implemented under democratic rules.  For example,
workers may oppose privatization, even though they believe that most of them would
benefit from it, because each one of them is unsure whether she has the necessary skills
to cope in the new system. 6
Let  us  now  consider  arguments  why  political  freedom  may  facilitate  the
economic transition.  They are often extensions of similar arguments why political and
civil liberties have a positive impact on economic growth in general.7 A particularly
powerful argument for post-communist countries is that only governments with  some
legitimacy will be able to implement and sustain policies bearing high short-term costs
as is needed during transition.  Democratically elected governments would tend to have
greater legitimacy, particularly during transition because democracy, political  freedom
and civil liberties were among the most important aspirations of the people  of those
countries.  In the  absence  of democratic  changes,  and the  legitimacy  they provide
governments, it is hard to implement economic reforms. Even if they are implemented
by non-democratic governments, there are significant uncertainties with respect to their
future, which weakens their impact.  Anecdotal evidence tends to support this view.  In
many of the Former Soviet Republics where the political transition either did not occur
or was only partial (e.g. in Uzbekistan and Belarus) many members  of the previous
elite remained in power and economic reforms are slow and carried out in a haphazard
way.
A  second  argument  is  that  the  institutional  changes,  e.g.  strengthening  an
independent legal  system  or a professional civil  service, that are required  to  ensure
political  freedom  and  democracy,  are  also  key  to  the  success  of  market  reforms.
Democratization  can be  complementary  to  economic  transition  because  it  creates
checks and balances and new norms that help lock in economic reforms. Proponents of
this view analyze the experience of Central Europe where political  reforms preceded
5 For example,  see the arguments  of the Russian  economist  Vladimir  Mau in Williamson  (1994).
6 Rodrik  (1995) argues  that there is a natural  dynamic  to the popularity  of economic  reforms in transition
countries. For instance,  reforms  in the public  enterprises  sector,  that were opposed  at the outset,  but were
embarked  upon anyhow,  may eventually  become  popular as the probability of losing state sector jobs
decline.
5economic liberalization, and argue that democracy created the window of opportunity
for  economic  transition.  Roland  (1997)  argues  that  President  Yeltsin  made  a
sequencing error in 1991 when he gave priority to economic issues.  Instead, he should
have focussed on building consensus on new democratic institutions, a new constitution
and elections.  Such an approach could have made it easier for Russia to subsequently
implement economic reforms.
A third argument is that dLemocratization  limits rent-seeking, because it puts in
place  a  system  of  checks  and  balances  that  penalizes  self-interested  leaders,  and
therefore  creates  an  atmosphere  conducive  to  economic  liberalization  policies  that
typically  reduce  rent-seeking  opportunities.  As  Aslund et  al.  (1996)  argue,  under
communism there were no checks and balances and there was a historical legacy of
exploitation.  In countries that  did not deal  with this political  issue early on  in the
transition one could observe that the old elite, especially state enterprise directors and
political leaders, continued to have a clear advantage over other interest groups. In the
absence of democratic  institutional reforms,  the personal interests  of "red  directors"
and  political  leaders  drive  the  political  agenda,  making  it  virtually  impossible  to
implement liberalization policies that seek to de-monopolize the economy and open it
up to competition.
To summarize, theoretical considerations, as well as anecdotal  evidence from
different countries can be used to support both the view that an authoritarian regime is
needed  to  push  through  economic  reforms  and  the  counter-argument  that
democratization is a necessary condition for economic liberalization: China liberalized
its  economy  without  democratization,  while  Central  Europe  democratized,  then
liberalized.
III.  The Model
We now examine the empirical evidence on the relationship  between political
freedom and economic liberalizaLtion  in twenty-five countries of CEE and the FSU. We
adopt  a broad  definition  of  "economic  liberalization",  that  includes  various  market
7 For example,  see McMillan  et al. (1991).
6oriented  reforms:  our  independent  variable  is  the  liberalization  index
(LIBERALIZATION)  developed by De Melo et al. (1996), which is weighted average
of three indices of liberalization in internal markets (liberalization  of domestic prices
and abolition of state monopolies), foreign trade liberalization (elimination of export
controls and taxes;  reduced import tariffs and elimination  of import  quotas; current
account convertibility) and private sector development (privatization of small and large
scale enterprises; banking reforms), respectively. The index assumes values from 0 (no
liberalization)  to  1  (complete  liberalization). 8 Note  that  our  independent  variable
represent the policies themselves and not the outcomes of these policies (i.e., growth or
increase in material  welfare).  We do not presuppose any link between  freedom and
welfare.  Rather we examine the link between freedom and the adoption of policies that
can, under favorable circumstances, lead to increases in welfare.
Figure  1 shows the relation, over the period 1992-1997, between this  index of
liberalization and an index of civil and political liberties (FREEDOM),  obtained from
various  Freedom House  reports,  which  assumes values from  2  (no  freedom)  to  14
(complete freedom).  The figure indicates a clear, positive relation between  freedom
and economic liberalization.  In fact, the linear correlation coefficient  is 0.86 and the
Spearman  rank  correlation  is  0.84.  Does  this  mean  that  political  freedom  has
significantly affected the economic liberalization process in the twenty-five countries in
our sample? To address this question, we estimate a model that evaluates the role of
freedom vis-a-vis other economic and political variables, during the transition.
Our regression model builds on earlier work by De Melo et al. (1996, 1997), but
we  look  more  in  depth. at  the  influence  of  political  variables  on  economic
9 liberalization9.
On the basis of the arguments developed in section II, the first variable we include in
our regression model is the index FREEDOM.  In addition, we hypothesize that, not
only did the democratization process have a positive impact on economic transition, but
also  freedom has been  an important precondition for  liberalization.  We thus  expect
countries  that  enjoyed  a  higher  level  of  freedom  before  the  start  of  the  transition
8 The variables  and the data sources  are described  in the appendix.
9 We also consider a longer period (1992-97), thus increasing the number of observations, compared to
the original De Melo et al. dataset.
7process to have been able to inl:roduce more comprehensive refonns  and to proceed
faster to a market economy. Therefore, we include initial freedom (INITFREEDOAF)
among the explanatory variables.10
The freedom  index has only an  ordinal meaning  and, since it is  a  qualitative
variable,  interpreting  the  magnitude  of  its  coefficient  in  the  regression  is  not  a
straightforward matter. Therefore, we also explore the relation between  freedom and
liberalization introducing dummy variables: the countries are divided in three groups
(free, partly free and not  free), on the basis  of Freedom House's  definition,'  and  a
dummy  is  assigned  to  free  and  not  free  countries  (respectively,  FREE  and
NOTFREE).
Figure  1. Liberalization  and Freedom
(average  1992-1997)
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10 It is not always easy to identify the year when the transition actually started. It is conmnonly assumed
that  the  transition started  in CEE countries before  FSU  countries. Hence,  for  CEE  countries, initial
freedom is measured in 1989, while, for FSU countries, the reference year is 1990.
11 Freedom House defines as "free" the countries for which the average of the (reversed) political rights
and civil liberties index is between 5 and 7, "partly free" those for which the average index is between 3
and 4.5, and "not free" those with a lower average.
8The political economy literature suggests that the implementation of economic
refonns,  and so the transition process, may be delayed by government  instability, for
various reasons.  First, high  government turnover makes the introduction of reforms
more difficult and increases the likelihood of policy reversals. Second,  governments
constantly under the threat of losing office may not be willing to introduce politically
costly  measures.  Third,  governments  uncertain  about  the  probability  of  being
reappointed engage in suboptimal policies in order to worsen the state of the economy
to be inherited by the successor 12. To test these links, we introduce, as a measure of
instability,  the  number  of  significant  government  changes  (GOVCHANGE).
"Significant" here means government changes that produce a transfer of power from
one leading party to another. 13
There may be also a relation between the frequency of government changes and
political  freedom since only in  democratic countries do opposite parties  alternate in
power;  therefore we introduce  in the model the variable FREESTAB,  which  is the
interaction  between  FREEDOM  and  GOVCHANGE. The  variable  assumes  higher
values for countries with greater political stability and larger freedom.
The political  economy literature also suggests that fragmented governments are
less able to agree on policy actions and, then, to implement reforms 14; so we created an
index of government cohesion (COHESION). This assumes values from 0 to 2 and it is
constructed  in  the  following  way:15 2  is  assigned  to  single party  governnents,  in
parliamentary systems or  "not divided"'6 governments, in  presidential  systems;  1 is
assigned to coalition governments, in parliamentary systems or "divided" governments,
in presidential systems and 0 to minority or caretaker governments.
12 Alesina and Tabellini (1990), Cukierman  et al. (1992), Edwards  and Tabellini (1992), Ozler and
Tabellini (1991).
13 The distinction  between  government  changes  that do not involve a substantial  turnover of leadership
and those that produce  a transfer of power between different political forces is comnonly  used  in the
emnpirical  political economy literature; see for instance Alesina et al. (1992) and Grilli et al. (1991).
14 Alesina and Drazen (1991).
15 Similar  variables  have  been  employed  by  the  empirical  political  economy  literature  in  various
contexts: see, for instance, Roubini and Sachs (1989 a, b), Edwards and Tabellini (1991) or Alesina and
Perotti (1995).
16 In a presidential system a government is said to be "not divided" when the same party has the control
of both the executive and the legislative branch.
9The variable COHESION is constructed on the basis of the hypothesis that single
party (or  not  divided)  governments are more  able to  pursue  liberalization  policies.
However, there are countries where single party governments are formed around the
reconstructed former communist party. We expect this type of government to be less
willing  to  carry  out  liberalization  policies.  Hence,  we  introduce  the  variable
COHESIDEOL, which represents the interaction between COHESION and a dummy
equal  to  0  when  the  government  in  power  is  the  former  communist  party  and  1
otherwise.
We also include a dummy variable for election years (ELECTIONS) to assess
whether the proximity of electoral consultations affects policy-makers'  decisions and
the variable AID,  which  is the amount of  foreign aid received by  the country as  a
percentage of GNP, to evaluate its role in the transition process. Foreign aid can help
launch  reforms  by  reducing  their  short-term  costs  (Williamson  1994), but  it  also
reduces the cost of doing nothing, that is of avoiding reforms (Rodrik 1996).
Our model also accounts for the role played by initial conditions in the transition
process,  an issue  specifically studied in De Melo  et  al. (1997).  Using the principal
components method,  these authors have constructed  two variables  for  that purpose.
INITMACRO,  a  linear  combination  of  variables  reflecting  the  degree  of  initial
macroeconomic  distortions  (e.g.  repressed  inflation,  black  market  premium,  trade
dependence), and 1NITDEVELOP, a linear combination of variables reflecting the so-
called "socialist  development overhang,"  (e.g. the overall  level of urbanization  and
over-industrialization)  at  the  beginning  of  the  transition.  Empirically,  we  expect
INITMACRO  to  have  a  negative  coefficient,  while  the  expected  sign  for
INITDEVELOP  is  less  clear.17 Our  model  includes  another  initial  condition,
INITREGIME  which is a dummy equal to  1 for countries where,  at the start of the
transition, non communist govetnments were in power. Finally, we introduce a dummy
variable for FSU countries.
17 For a discussion  on this point, see De Melo et al. (1997),  p. 19.
10IV.  Empirical Findings
We can now examine our findings.  Table 1 presents the results of Ordinary Least
Squares (OLS) estimates of the model. The observations for the twenty-five countries
over the years 1992-97 have been pooled together.1 8 The lagged dependent variable is
introduced  among the regressors for two reasons: to eliminate serial correlation and,
second, because the values of the variable LIBERALIZATION,  at each moment,  are
expected to  depend on those from the previous period, since the liberalization index
assesses the progress of the economic reform process, not its pace of change.
Our estimates show that FREEDOM  has  a significant, positive  impact on the
liberalization  process.  However,  the  coefficients  of  the  dummies  FREE  and
NOTFREE,  although they have the expected sign, are not significant, suggesting that it
is not the absence (or presence) of freedom that has prevented (or helped) the transition
to  the market.  It  indicates  on  the  contrary that  the two  processes  of  political  and
economic  liberalization  in  the  CEE  and  FSU  countries  have  been  strongly
complementary.  Note  also  that  initial  freedom  (INITFREEDOM)  always  has  a
significant  coefficient,  confirming  our  hypothesis  that  democracy  has  been  an
important precondition for reformn  implementation.
The  coefficients  of  the  government  instability  variables  are  not  significant.
COHESION  has  a negative, slightly significant coefficient. Instead,  COHESJDEOL
has a positive, significant coefficient, suggesting that govemment cohesion has favored
the transition, but only when the executive was not ran by a former communist party.
The coefficients of the dummy for war tom countries always have the expected sign
and are significant.
The significant, positive coefficient of the variable AID  indicates that  external
help has played an important role in the liberalization process, possibly because of the
conditionality attached to programs involving foreign financial assistance.19 However,
18 The choice of the 1992-97  time  period has been dictated  by data availability  and reliability  and by the
disappearance  of the Soviet Union by  1992, leading to the creation of independent and sovereign
countries.  Data on external aid are available  only until 1996 so, in the regressions  which include this
variable,  observations  are for the period 1992-96.
19 The World Development  Indicators  data on aid do not distinguish  among  different  types of assistance
(programs,  food aid, emergency  assistance,  etc.), each of which has diverse  characteristics  and different
effects on the economy.
11this result has to be interpreted with some caution. The direction of causality may be
two-way: financial assistance may have been provided primarily to countries that had
already introduced economic reforms. We also included the lagged variable, AID(-I),
but it turned out to be insignificant.
Concerning  the  role  of  elections,  the  positive  significant  coefficient  of
ELECTION(-I)  supports the "honeymoon  hypothesis"  that policy-makers  are more
willing  to  introduce  unpopular  reforms  immediately  after  they  take  office  partly
because  they  can  blame  their  short-term  cost  on  the  outgoing  forrner  communist
government  (Williamson,  1994).  By  contrast,  the  coefficient  of  the  dummy
ELECTION(+])  is negative, indicating that refonns  are slowed down in  the period
before elections.
In sum, our OLS estimates indicate that freedom has played an important role in
promoting  the liberalization  process. However,  the crucial issue  of the  direction of
causality between freedom and liberalization needs to be investigated. Causality may
run both ways. Formal tests  of causality of the Granger  type would not  be  reliable
given the short time  series.  However, we can address the possible  simultaneity bias
between freedom and liberalization using instrumental variable methods.
Table 2 shows the results obtained by estimating the same model by Two-Stages
Least Squares (2SLS), using the lagged value of FREEDOM  as the instrument for its
current value.  The table shows clearly that, in such a setup, FREEDOM  looses its
significance, while the coefficients for all other variables that, in our OLS estimation
(Table 1), have the expected sign and are significant,  maintain  their explanatory  power
also in  the 2SLS estimates of Table 2.  In particular, INITFREEDOM  keeps its
expected  positive,  sign  and its significance  in all the regressions.
12TABLE 1. OLS ESTIMATES.
Dependent  variable:  LIBERALIZATION
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)
CONSTANT  0.14***  0.09**  0.09**  0.08***  0.08**  0.08**  0.1`1**
(2.89)  (2.10)  (2.70)  (3.34)  (2.11)  (2.57)  (4.23)
LIBERALIZATION  (-1)  0.71***  0.72***  0.72***  0.72***  0.75***  0.74***  0.80***
(15.89)  (18.0)  (20.5)  (17.2)  (21.0)  (23.2)  (27.5)
FREEDOM  0.006*  0.01**  0.01***  0.01***  0.01***  0.01***
(1.68)  (2.39)  (3.03)  (2.62)  (2.92)  (2.89)
GOVCHANGE  0.005  0.01  0.01  -
(0.13)  (0.20)  (0.15)
FREESTAB  0.004  0.004  0.003  0.002  - - -
(0.55)  (0.52)  (0.48)  (0.84)
COHESIDEOL  0.02*  0.02*  0.02**  0.02**  0.02**  0.02**  0.02***
(1.77)  (1.85)  (2.07)  (2.10)  (2.11)  (2.20)  (2.63)
COHESION  -0.03*
(1.90)
AID  0.003**  0.004***  0.004***  0.004***  0.004***  0.004***  0.004***
(2.04)  (3.49)  (3.69)  (2.73)  (3.63)  (3.67)  (2.87)
WAR  -0.04**  -0.04**  -0.04**  -0.04**  -0.04**  -0.04**  -0.06***
(2.06)  (2.09)  (2.22)  (2.06)  (2.26)  (2.40)  (3.49)
INITMACRO  0.00  0.00  - - - - -
(0.63)  (0.05)
INITDEVELOP  -0.00  0.00  - - -
(0.55)  (0.37)
INITREGIME  0.02  - -
(1.00)
INITFREEDOM  0.01***  0.01*  0.01**  0.01**  0.01**  0.01**  0.013***
(3.25)  (1.93)  (2.21)  (2.84)  (1.99)  (2.33)  (3.49)
FSU  - - - - 0.01  - -
(0.50)
Adjusted  R-squared  0.91  0.91  0.91  0.91  0.91  0.91  0.91
F- statistic  107***  125***  158***  183***  182***  213***  239***
White  test for  116.0**  58.5  50.8  46.9*  37.3  34.4  30.8**
heteroscedasticity
Number  of observations  125  125  125  125  125  125  125
Absolute  value  of t-statistic  in parenthesis.  *, **, and *** mean  that the coefficient  is significant
respectively  at 10%,  5% and 1  % level  of confidence.  The  t-statistics  in equation  (1), (4) and  (7) are
obtained  using  the White  heteroscedasticity-consistent  standard  errors.
13TABLE I (Continued).  OLS ESTIMATE'S.
Dependent  variable:  LIBERALIZATION
(8)  (9)  (10)  (1  1)  (12)
CONSTANT  0.18***  0.20***  0.20***  0.08**  0.09***
(7.82)  (6.92)  (6.83)  (2.41)  (3.50)
LIBERALIZATION  (-1)  0.78***  0.78***  0.77***  0.72***  0.74***
(25.00)  (23.4)  (22.16)  (22.3)  (17.47)
FREEDOM  - - - 0.01  ***  0.01**
(3.27)  (2.47)
FREE  0.02  - 0.02
(1.31)  (1.02)
NONFREE  - -0.04  -0.03  -
(1.45)  (1.33)
COHESIDEOL  0.02**  0.01  0.02*  0.02**  0.02**
(2.12)  (1.26)  (1.38)  (2.03)  (2.28)
AID  0.003***  0.003**  0.003***  0.003***  0.004***
(2.79)  (2.18)  (2.38)  (3.32)  (2.86)
WAR  -0.04**  -0.04**  -0.03*  -0.04**  -0.04**
(2.44)  (2.19)  (1.94)  (2.27)  (2.29)
INITFREEDOM  - - - 0.01**  0.01***
(2.30)  (2.78)
ELECTION  (-1)  - - - 0.03**  -
(2.05)
ELECTION  (+1)  - - - - -0.03*
(1.89)
Adjusted  R-squared  0.90  0.90  0.90  0.91  0.91
F- statistic  229***  234***  194***  188***  189***
White  test  for  31.7**  32.3**  33.6**  33.4  56.14***
heteroscedasticity
Number  of observations  125  125  125  125  125
Absolute value of t-statistic in parenthesis. *, **, and *** mean that the coefficient is significant
respectively  at 10%,  5%  and 1  % level  of confidence.
The  t-statistics  in equations  (8)-(1  0) and (12)  are  obtained  using  the White  heteroscedasticity-consistent
standard  errors.
14TABLE  2. TWO-STAGE  LEAST  SQUARES  ESTIMATES.
Dependent  variable:  LIBERALIZATION
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)
CONSTANT  0.19***  0.12**  0.11**  0.11***  0.10***  0.10**
(3.15)  (2.73)  (3.14)  (3.14)  (2.75)  (3.10)
LIBERALIZATION  (-1)  0.75***  0.76***  0.77***  0.78***  0.78***  0.78***
(15.18)  (17.3)  (18.9)  (19.1)  (20.0)  (21.6)
FREEDOM  -0.004  -0.001  0.01  0.002  0.002  0.002
(0.72)  (2.39)  (0.62)  (0.65)  (0.58)  (0.60)
GOVCHANGE  0.02  0.03  0.02  -
(0.48)  (0.57)  (0.36)
FREESTAB  0.004  0.005  0.003  0.001  - -
(0.62)  (0.67)  (0.45)  (0.34)
COHESIDEOL  0.02  0.02*  0.02**  0.02**  0.02**  0.02**
(1.57)  (1.79)  (2.36)  (2.34)  (2.36)  (2.39)
COHESION  -0.03*
(1.92)
AID  0.004***  0.005***  0.004***  0.004***  0.004***  0.004***
(2.91)  (3.90)  (3.70)  (3.71)  (3.68)  (3.70)
WAR  -0.05***  -0.05***  -0.05***  -0.05***  -0.05***  -0.05***
(2.70)  (2.64)  (2.82)  (2.84)  (2.87)  (2.96)
INITMACRO  -0.00  -0.00  - - - -
(0.92)  (0.68)
INITDEVELOP  0.00  0.00  - - -
(0.47)  (1.44)
INITREGIME  0.04  - - - - -
(1.56)
INITFREEDOM  0.02***  0.01*  0.01**  0.01**  0.01**  0.01**
(3.43)  (1.68)  (2.36)  (2.37)  (2.23)  (2.42)
FSU  - - - - 0.001  -
(0.04)
Adjusted  R-squared  0.90  0.90  0.91  0.91  0.91  0.91
F- statistic  1  00***  117***  151  ***  174***  173***  204***
White  test  for  112.1**  58.3  46.7  43.8  38.5  34.0
heteroscedasticity
Number  of observations  125  125  125  125  125  125
Absolute  value  of t-statistic  in parenthesis.  *, **, and *** mean  that  the coefficient  is significant
respectively  at 10%,  5% and 1  % level  of confidence.  The  t-statistics  in equation  (1)  are
obtained  using  the  White heteroscedasticity-consistent  standard  errors.
15In conclusion,  the results from the 2SLS estimates  indicate that there is a two-
way causality between market-oriented  reforns  and freedom. These estimates also
confirm the  crucial role of  freedom as  a precondition for  introducing economic
reforms: countries  that entered  ithe  transition  process  with more democratic  institutions
and greater civil liberties have been able to implement  faster and more comprehensive
reform  policies.
Robustness of the Results
To test the robustness of our results, in particular on the importance of freedom as
a  precondition  for  liberalization,  we  estimate the  same model  adopting  a  different
measure  for  the intensity  of  economic reforms:  we use  the  liberalization  indicator
compiled by the EBRD.  We aggregated the various indicators published in the EBRD's
Transition  Report  to  construci- EBRDINDEX. Unfortunately,  since  this  measure  is
available  only  since  1994, initial  freedom is measured  in  1993  (FREEDOM1993).
Figure 2 plots the value assumed by EBRDINDEX in 1997 against freedom in 1993 for
our  sample of countries,  indicating  a clear positive  linear relation  between  the two
variables.
Figure 2. Liberalization and Initial Freedom
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16We re-estimated our model using EBRDINDEX  as the dependent variable.
Results of the OLS estimates are reported in Table 3 20  The variable FREEDOM  is
not  included  among  the  explanatory  variables  because  it  is  highly  collinear  with
FREEDOM1993.  The regressions in Table 3 confirm our previous  findings, since the
coefficients of FREEDOM1993  have the expected sign and are significant.  Note also
that  initial  freedom  is  the  only  variable  that  keeps  its  explanatory  power  in  the
estimates that use a different definition of the dependent variable 21.
We can summarize our findings by  saying that our model  reveals clearly that
initial  freedom  has  been  a  crucial  determinant  of  economic  reforms  during  the
transition process. This conclusion is confirmed under various model specifications, for
both OLS and 2SLS procedures and using two different measures of liberalization.
20 The estirnation  period is 1995-1997.
21  Coefficients for  the other political and  economnic  variables (external aid, interaction between
government cohesion and government  ideology, war-tom country dumrnmy  and elections) that are
significant  in Table 2 are not validated  when  the EBRD  indicator  of liberalization  is used.
17TABLE 3. OLS ESTIMATES.
Dependent  variable:  EBRDINDEX
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)
CONSTANT  2.55***  2.72***  2.92***  2.71***  2.6***  2.72***  3.35***
(3.06)  (3.88)  (3.16)  (3.88)  (3.18)  (3.92)  (3.89)
EBRDINDEX(-I)  0.72***  0.73***  0.72***  0.72***  0.71***  0.72***  0.70***
(8.52)  (10.73)  (10.3)  (10.7)  (8.63)  (10.8)  (6.85)
FREEDOM1993  0.22**  0.17**  0.18**  0.19**  0.23**  0.19**  0.19**
(2.11)  (2.12)  (2.25)  (2.34)  (2.32)  (2.37)  (1.99)
GOVCHANGE  1.69  1.14  -
(0.67)  (0.73)
FREESTAB  0.38  0.20  - -0.001  - -
(0.76)  (0.69)  (0.02)
COHESIDEOL  0.40  0.28  0.26  0.26  0.24  0.26
(1.47)  (1.30)  (1.22)  (1.22)  (1.34)  (1.23)
AID  -0.002  - - - 0.00  -
(0.04)  (0.01)
WAR  0.65  - 0.49  0.49  0.67  0.48
(0.96)  (0.93)  (0.93)  (1.01)  (0.93)
FSU  - - -0.13  - -
(0.33)
Adjusted  R-squared  0.85  0.84  0.84  0.84  0.85  0.84  0.84
F- statistic  40.2***  65.3***  78.9***  78.7***  57.9***  99.9***  195.7***
White  test for  23.2  20.0  21.1  19.7  21.8  18.7  18.1***
heteroscedasticity
Number  of observations  50  75  75  75  50  75  75
Absolute value of t-statistic in parenthesis. *, **, and *** mean that the coefficient is significant
Respectively  at 10%,  5%  and 1%  level  of confidence.  The  t-statistics  in equation  (7)  are
Obtained  using  the  White heteroscedasticity-consistent  standard  errors.
18V. Further Tests of Robustness
As  shown  in  the  previous  sections, INITFREEDOM  played  a  key  role  in
promoting a successful transition to a market-based economy in the 25 country sample
considered. We now want to further test this result in two ways. First, we introduce in
the model other initial conditions that may have facilitated or hindered the transition
process.  Second, we  divide the  country sample into two  groups,  one  including  the
members  of  the  Community  of  Independent  States  (CIS countries),  and  the  other
comprising the CEE countries and the Baltics (non-CIS).
With regard to the former point, we have isolated and added to the model the
following variables:  the number of  years under  central planning  (YEARPLANN),  a
dummy  for  countries  that  were  independent  states before  1989,  rather  than  being
members of a federation (STATE)  and a dummy for countries geographically close to
market  economies  (LOCATION).  These  exogenous  factors may  have  affected  the
political and institutional development of the countries under consideration as well as
their willingness  and/or ability to  adopt Western institutional  models  and  lifestyles,
including  a democratic  structure of  the society. Hence, the  important role of  initial
freedom by itself will be reinforced if this variable is found not to be correlated with
the other initial conditions and if INITPREEDOM  results to be significant even when
these new explanatory variables are introduced in the estimated model.
The rationale for the latter approach is that, in many respects, CIS and non-CIS
countries have experienced very different patterns of transition 22. Hence, an important
indication of robustness would be obtained if INITFREEDOM resulted significant for
both groups of countries.
Additional initial conditions.  As shown in Table 4 below, INITFREEDOM  is not
strongly correlated with  any of the other initial conditions introduced  in  the model.
Furthermore, as shown in Table 5, INITFREEDOM maintains its significance in the
2SLS  and  OLS estimates that include  the additional  explanatory variables.  All this
confirms,  once  more,  that  democracy per  se  considerably  affected  the  transition
22 See,  for instance,  Fischer  et al. (1997).
19process. Note also that the other initial conditions considered had a significant impact
on LIBERALIZATION.
TABLE  4. CORRELATION  MATRIX
YEARPLANN LOCATION  STATE
INITFREEDOM  0.24  0.07  -0.36
YEARPLANN  -0.59  -0.54
LOCATION  0.16
Dividing the sample into two groups. Finally, we have reestimated the model for the
non-CIS countries  alone, to  evaluate whether the  findings on  the important  role of
initial  freedom  for the  economic  transition  still hold 23. As  shown  in  Table  6, the
coefficients of INITFREEDO0M  are always positive and significant, which  confirms
that democracy has been a crucial precondition for the introduction and implementation
of market-oriented reforms.
23 We could not estimate the model for the group of CIS countries alone, because of the limited
variability  of  INITFREEDOM  within  this  sub-sample.
20TABLE  5. INITIAL  FREEDOM  VS  OTHER  INITIAL  CONDITIONS
Dependent  variable:  LIBERALIZATION
Two-Stages  Least  Squares  Ordinary  Least  Squares
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)
CONSTANT  0.25***  0.31***  0.23***  0.30***
(3.81)  (4.29)  (4.88)  (5.74)
LIBERALIZATION  (-1)  0.70***  0.69***  0.70***  0.69***
(18.16)  (18.03)  (18.05)  (18.19)
FREEDOM  -0.00  -0.001
(0.48)  (0.22)
COHESIDEOL  0.02***  0.02***  0.02***  0.02***
(2.62)  (2.68)  (2.62)  (2.69)
AID  0.004***  0.004***  0.004***  0.004***
(3.90)  (4.26)  (5.20)  (5.71)
WAR  -0.05***  -0.05***  -0.05***  -0.05***
(2.66)  (2.94)  (2.73)  (3.10)
INITFREEDOM  0.01  **  0.01Q**  0.01***  0.01***
(2.55)  (2.34)  (3.32)  (3.45)
YEARPLANN  -0.002**  -0.002***  -0.002***  -0.002***
(2.16)  (2.79)  (2.71)  (3.61)
LOCATION  0.04**  0.04*  0.04**  0.03*
(2.34)  (1.89)  (2.16)  (1.81)
STATE  - -0.04*  - -0.04***
(1.93)  (3.19)
Adjusted  R-squared  0.91  0.92  0.91  0.92
F- statistic  163.0***  150.3***  191.2***  172.0***
White  test  for  55.67*  62.01  53.52**  57.49***
heteroscedasticity
Number  of observations  125  125  125  125
Absolute value of t-statistic in parenthesis. *, **,  and *** mean that the coefficient is significant
Respectively  at 10%,  5% and 1  % level  of confidence.  The  t-statistics  in equation  (4) and ( 5) are
Obtained  using  the White  heteroscedasticity-consistent  standard  errors.
21TABLE  6. NON-CIS  COUNTRIES.  TWO-STAGE  LEAST  SQUARES  ESTIMATES.
Dependent  variable:  LIBERALIZATION
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)
CONSTANT  0.33***  0.37***  0.26***  0.31***  0.34***
(4.27)  (3.75)  (5.50)  (4.25)  (3.89)
LIBERALIZATION  (-1)  0.58***  0.57***  0.60***  0.58***  0.57***
(10.20)  (10.42)  (13.4)  (10.15)  (8.82)
FREEDOM  -0.00  -0.002  0.001  -0.001  -0.003
(0.02)  (0.32)  (0.34)  (0.17)  (0.44)
COHESIDEOL  - -0.01  - - -
(1.09)
AID  - - 0.003***  - -
(3.94)
WAR  -0.04  -0.04  -0.03  -0.03  -0.03
(1.43)  (1.48)  (1.21)  (1.32)  (1.18)
INITMACRO  - - - - -0.00
(0.41)
INITDEVELOP  - - - - 0.00
(2.66)
INITREGIME  - - - 0.03*
(1.85)
INITFREEDOM  0.01***  0.01**  0.01***  0.01***  0.01**
(2.67)  (2.33)  (2.73)  (2.67)  (2.21)
Adjusted  R-squared  0.82  0.91  0.85  0.81  0.82
F- statistic  86.6*"*  68.79***  71.8***  68.6***  58.6***
White  test  for  46.37***  54.18***  23.69  47.06***  55.01***
heteroscedasticity
Number  of observations  78  78  65  78  78
Absolute  value of t-statistic  in parenthesis.  *, *  and ***  mean  that the coefficient  is  significant
Respectively  at 10%,  5% and 1%  level  of confidence.  The  t-statistics  in equation  (1), (2), (4)  and (5) are
Obtained  using  the White heteroscedasticity-consistent  standard  errors.
22VI.  Conclusions
This  paper  has  analyzed the role  of  political  freedom  and  civil  liberties in
determining the intensity of market-oriented reforms in the transition countries of CEE
and the FSU.
First, the theoretical links between democracy and economic liberalization have
been  identified.  We  have  shown  that  there  exist  arguments  for  why  authoritarian
leadership  may  be  needed  to  introduce  reforms  in  the  early  stages  of  economic
transition, but, that there are also arguments as to why democratic reforms must come
first to provide political  space for economic liberalization.  Then, we have provided
empirical  evidence on  the relationship between  democracy  and liberalization  in  25
countries  of  CEE  and  FSU.  Our  findings  support  the  hypothesis  that  freedom
facilitates,  rather  than  hinders,  the  adoption  of  market-oriented  reforms.  These
empirical  findings  reveal  that  freedom  and  market-oriented  reform  policies  are
complementary and self-reinforcing processes. They also show that the existence of a
vibrant civil society at the start of the transition process is one of the main explanatory
variables for the adoption of liberalization policies. This result is robust to alternative
model specifications.
Although  this  paper  has  shown  that  democracy  facilitated  the  liberalization
process in several transition countries, political freedom should not be seen as either a
necessary  or a sufficient  condition  for liberalization,  given that  some  countries  (for
example,  China) were  able to  implement  market  oriented  reforms,  without  a  fully-
pledged democracy and others (such as Russia and Ukraine) were not able to introduce
substantial economic reforms, even with a more democratic structure of the society.
In  these  conclusions,  we  elaborate  on  the  above propositions,  making  more
explicit the mechanisms that are at work. Essentially, three points have been made to
argue that political  freedom facilitates economic liberalization.  The first is political:
given the heavy  short term  costs  entailed by  economic liberalization  policies,  only
democratically elected governments have the legitimacy to carry them out. The second
is  a  political  economy  argument: the  emergence of  democratic  political  institutions
changes the  incentives  for rent-seeking.  The third  argument  is  institutional: market
23oriented  reforms  requires  the  introduction  of  accompanying  changes  in  the
constitutional and legal framewoik.
In connection with the last argument, the Freedom Index used for the empirical
analysis should be viewed as a proxy for more general institutional development-the
development of civil society, which predates the start of the transition by years, decades
and often centuries.  In  fact, the constitutional  and  legal  changes, necessary  for the
implementation  of comprehensive market  oriented  reforms,  can be  imposed by  the
majority only if civil society organizations are strong enough to organize and articulate
the interests  of this  majority. Under  the socialist  regime,  the organizations  of civil
society  (i.e.  political  parties,  trade  unions,  etc.)  were  "focused  narrowly  on  the
perceived interest of the state" (F'EBRD  1997), although some clandestine organizations
were  active in  several countries. When market  reforms began,  most  countries were
operating  in  a  political  and  institutional  vacuum:  political  parties  (other  than  the
Communist Party) or unions with a significant following existed in few countries only;
there was no well-defined process for choosing political leaders and demarcating their
powers; the press  and media had  no tradition  of independent  reporting;  checks and
balances did not exist; and the j-udicial system was unprepared to challenge the abuses
of power of political  leaders if  necessary.  Civil society developed  in the transition
countries as soon as governments lifted their prohibition. In Central and Eastern Europe
it  grew  more  rapidly  and  smoothed the  progress  of  market  oriented  reforms.  By
contrast, in most of the former Soviet Union countries, civil society was much weaker
and there was a battle for power between various factions of the elite and reformers. In
some cases, the old elite was successful in resisting reforms, thus thwarting both the
development of free political institutions and the introduction of economic reforms.
The  recent  empirical  political  economy  literature  has  emphasized  the
importance  of political  parties,  political  rules  and  legal  institutions  in  determining
economic outcomes.  For transition countries, while important political economy issues
have been discussed in recent  theoretical papers,  the number  of empirical  studies is
very limited (in large part becau,se of unavailability of time series data).  There has been
relatively little  empirical research on civil  society.  One reason  is the high  level of
covariance between available indicators and the difficulty in finding adequate proxies
24for  civil  society  as  an  explanatory variable. 24 The  Freedom  House  index,  though
adequate, is imprecise.  It is not clear whether it measures the quality of institutions, of
the political participation process or of individual attitudes vis-a-vis public  authority.
Future research  should help to clarify this point, thus facilitating the identification of
various  channels  through  freedom  affects  economic policy  (the  role  of  media  in
influencing public opinion, the importance of political participation, of trust in public
institutions, of transparency, etc).
24 Campos and Nugent  (1998) note a  very high Spearman rank correlation  coefficient between  five
indicators related  to freedom and political participation:  political rights and  civil liberties  (both  from
Freedom House),  competitiveness  and  regulation of political participation,  and  "strong  civil society"
which is the interaction of the previous two (the latter three indicators from the Polity III data set.  See
Jaggers and Gurr 1995)
25APPENDIX: VARIABLE DEFINITION AND DATA SOURCES
This appendix provides  a description of the variables and data sources. The political
variables were  constructed using  the following sources: Keesing's  Record of  World
Events (various issues), the Political Handbook of the World (1998), and Szajkowski
(1994).
TIME VARYING VARIABLES:
AID: foreign aid as a percentage of GNP. Source: World Bank,  World Development
Indicators Database, 1998.
COHESION:  index  of  government  cohesion  assuming  values  from  0  to  2.  It  is
constructed  in  the  following  vvay: 2  is  assigned  to  single  party  governments  in
parliamentary systems or "not divided" governments in presidential systems; the value
1  is  assigned  to  coalition  govenments  in  parliamentary  systems  or  "divided"
governments  in  presidential  systems;  and  0  is  assigned  to  minority  or  caretaker
governments. Source: see above.
COHESIDEOL:  interaction  between  COHESION and  a dummy  equal  to  zero for
former Communist governments, and equal to zero otherwise.
EBRDINDEX: Index of economic liberalization constructed as the sum of four indices:
large and small-scale privatization, enterprise restructuring, trade and foreign exchange
system, and banking reform. Source: EBRD Transition Report, various issues.
FREEDOM: The sum of two seven-points indices for civil liberties and political rights
published by  Freedom House  (previously, by  R.  Gastil).  Since the  two  indices  are
highly correlated with each other (with a correlation coefficient is 0.95), they are here
summed together  to  get FREEDOM,  a variable which  assumes values  from  2  (no
freedom) to  14 (complete  freedom).  Note  that the values  of  the original  Freedom
House indices have been reversed. Source: Freedom House.
FREESTAB: interaction  between  FREEDOM  and  GOVCHANGE.  The variable is
constructed as follows. First the original (i.e. not  reversed) Freedom House index of
freedom is multiplied by the nLmber of significant govermment changes. Second, this
product is multiplied by (-1), se that higher values of FREESTAB are associated with
countries with more freedom aind fewer significant government changes. Source: see
above.
GOVCHANGE: number of significant government changes, i.e. changes that produce a
transfer  of  power  from  one  leading  party  to  another.  A  government  change  is
considered significant if the following conditions hold: for a parliamentary  system if
there  is a change  in  the party  of the prime minister  and  in  the  coalition  of parties
supporting the government; for a presidential system, if there is a change in the party of
either  the prime  minister  or  the president.  Also irregular  transfers  of  governments
(coups) are recorded as significant government changes. Source: see above.
26LIBERALIZATION: liberalization index. It is a weighted average of three indices that
respectively account for liberalization in the internal markets, liberalization in external
markets  and for private  sector development. The index assumes  values from  0  (no
liberalization) to  1 (complete liberalization). Source: De Melo  et al. The indices have
been update for 1997 on the basis of EBRD (1997).
WAR: dummy for war torn countries.
INITIAL CONDITIONS:
FREEDOM1993: initial freedom, measured by the (reversed) Freedom House index in
1993. Source: Freedom House.
FSU: dummy for countries of the Former Soviet Union.
INITDEVELOP: measure of initial overall level of development, constructed  by De
Melo  et  al.  (1997).  Linear  combination,  obtained  using  the  method  of  principal
components, of variables reflecting structural development factors (per capita income,
urbanization, over-industrialization, etc.). Source: De Melo et al. (1997).
INITFREEDOM: initial freedom, measured by the (reversed) Freedom House index.
For CEE countries initial freedom is measured in 1989, for FSU countries the reference
year is 1990. Source: Freedom House.
INITMA CRO: measure of initial macroeconomic conditions, constructed by De Melo
et al. (1997). Linear combination, obtained using the method of principal components,
of  variables  reflecting  the  degree  of  initial  macroeconomics  distortions  (trade
dependence, repressed  inflation and black market premium).  Source: De Melo  et al.
(1997).
INITREGIME: dummy equal to 1 for countries where, at the start of the transition, non
communist governments were in power. Source: see above.
LOCATION: dummy for countries geographically close to market economies. Source:
De Melo et al. (1997).
STATE: dummy equal to 1 for countries that were independent states before  1989and
equal to 0 for countries that were members of a federation.
YEARPLANN: number of years under central planning. Source: De Melo et al. (1997).
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